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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 10, 1995, President Clinton announced broad executive action to
protect children and adolescents from the dangers of tobacco products.1
Through executive authority, the President is attempting to sharply restrict the
1 President's News Conference, 31 WKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1415 (Aug. 10,1995).
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advertising, promotion, distribution, and marketing of tobacco products for
children and adolescents 2 by authorizing the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to seek jurisdiction over tobacco products as "drug delivery devices."3
The FDA is proposing new federal regulations4 to govern the sale and
distribution of tobacco products5 to children and adolescents in order to
address the serious public health problems caused by the use of and addiction
to these products. 6 Tobacco product use among children and adolescents is a
health epidemic problem.7 It is such a problem that FDA Commissioner Dr.
David Kessler in a March, 1995 speech at the Columbia University School of
Law labeled smoking a "pediatric disease."8
This paper will reveal that although the FDA has a compelling argument
from a public health point of view to regulate tobacco products, the proposed
federal rule is beyond the scope of the FDA's authority. The FDA cannot
unilaterally assert jurisdiction over tobacco products in order to implement
restrictions for children and adolescents without specific Congressional action.
Instead, Congress has specifically delegated such regulatory authority to the
states.9 Moreover, the proposed rule lacks necessary enforcement mechanisms
to adequately keep tobacco products out of the hands of children and
adolescents.
The primary purpose of this note is to illustrate that the FDA's proposed rule
is beyond its jurisdiction and contrary to the intent of Congress. Special
emphasis is given to how the tobacco industry controls the political agenda for
tobacco control initiatives. Tobacco control laws similar to restrictions placed
2Id.
3 See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
4 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco Products To Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41314
(1995)[hereinafter 60 Fed. Reg.] (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 801, 803, 804, and
897)(proposed Aug. 11, 1995).
5
'Tobacco products" means nicotine-containing cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
products for purposes of this paper. See Id. at 41322 (commenting that proposed rules
would not apply to pipe tobacco or cigars because current evidence does not
conclusively prove that these products are with the scope of the FDA's proposed
authority and most children and adolescents use cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
products).
61d. at 41314.
7Office on Smoking and Health, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Preventing
Tobacco Use Among Young People: A Report of the Surgeon General (1994) at foreword.
[hereinafter Surgeon General Report, 1994].
8Wayne Heam, FDA Action Would Show Tobacco is 'Lethal Drug,' AM MED. NEWS,
July 31,1995, at 1; see also FDA Commissioner David Kessler, Remarks at Georgetown
University Conference on Tobacco and Children (Aug. 16,1995)(transcript available in
LEXIS).
9See 42 U.S.C.S. 300x-26.(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
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on alcoholic beverages sales should be enacted at the state and local level.
Additionally, local governments should be permitted to have the flexibility to
enact stricter tobacco control initiatives without being preempted by state law.
The effort to keep tobacco products out of the hands of children and
adolescents should be a cooperative federalism approach with each level of
government having its own responsibility. The federal government would
provide guidance and funding to states through the Synar Amendment rule,
and the states and local governments would enact and enforce aggressive
tobacco control initiatives. Because states and local governments are closest to
the problem of tobacco use among children and adolescents, states and local
governments are best suited to resolve the problem. This federalism approach
to tobacco control for children and adolescents is already possible under
existing federal statutes without additional federal intrusion. The strength of
the tobacco industry's lobby, however, has prevented additional practical
tobacco control policy for children and adolescents from being enacted.
Following the introduction of this note, Section II provides an overview and
an analysis of the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco products. This
section includes alarming statistics on tobacco use among children and
adolescents and the tobacco industry advertising. Section III of the paper
addresses the problems of the FDA's unilateral attempt to assert jurisdiction
over tobacco products in constitutional and federalism contexts. Section IV
reveals how the tobacco industry controls the political agenda at the federal
and state level for tobacco control initiatives through sophisticated lobbying
efforts and campaign contributions. Finally, Section V provides a state and local
policy to substantially reduce tobacco use among children and adolescents and
an explanation on why these methods are preferable over other regulatory
schemes.
II. THE FDA ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION OVER TOBACCO PRODUCTS TO PLACE
REGULATIONS FOR CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS
A. An Overview of the FDA Proposed Rule for Tobacco Products
The primary objective of the proposed rule is to reduce the death and disease
caused by tobacco products. The goal of the proposed rule is to achieve one of
the objectives of "Healthy People 2000:"10 namely to reduce tobacco use among
children and adolescents by half by the year 2000.11 Furthermore, if the
objective of the proposed rule is not met within seven years after publication
of a final rule, the FDA can take additional regulatory initiatives in order to
10The Healthy 2000 Report discussed national health promotion and disease
prevention objectives in this country. It was facilitated by the Institute of Medicine of
the National Academy of Sciences, with the help of the U.S. Public Health Service, and
included participation of almost 300 national membership organizations and all State
health departments. See 60 Fed. Reg., supra note 4.
11id. at 41321.
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achieve the Healthy 2000 goal. 12 Therefore, if the number of children and
adolescents using tobacco products is not reduce by half within seven years
after implementation of the rule, then additional restrictions may be imposed
by the FDA. This is an aggressive goal especially through the provisions of the
FDA's proposed rule which are open-ended. However, the key component to
reduce tobacco use among children and adolescents, as further discussed in
Section V, is to substantially reduce children and adolescents' access to tobacco
products.
The proposed federal rule addresses two areas of regulations. First, the
proposed rule makes tobacco products less accessible to children and
adolescents through greater sales restrictions, and second, it places restrictions
on labeling and advertising to help reduce the appeal of tobacco products to
children and adolescents.
The proposed rule specifically includes the following provisions: (1)
establish eighteen (18) years of age as the minimum age for the purchase of
tobacco products; (2) eliminate the use of cigarette vending machines, free
samples, mail-order sales, and self-serve displays; (3) require retailers to
comply with certain conditions regarding tobacco sales;13 (4) limit the
advertising and labeling to which children and adolescents are exposed to a
text-only format; (5) ban the sale or distribution of brand-named tobacco items;
(6) restrict sponsorship of events to the corporate name only; and (7) require
tobacco manufacturers to create and fund a national public education
campaign aimed at persons under the age of eighteen to counter the positive
image of tobacco product advertisements. 14
The action taken by the Clinton Administration and the FDAhas been widely
hailed as the most important step in tobacco control since the Surgeon
General's 1964 Report on Smoking and Cancer.15 On the day of the proposed
rule announcement, the tobacco industry and various advertising and
publishing associations in response to the proposed rule filed separate
lawsuits. The lawsuits seek a declaratory judgment that FDA's assertion of
jurisdiction over tobacco products is exceeding the agency's statutory
authority, usurping the authority of Congress and violating the First
121d. at 41375 (citing proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.44).
13Proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.14 "Additional Responsibilities of Retailers" would
require all retailers and their employees to verify proof of the purchaser's age, require
face-to-face sales, and prohibit retailers or their employees from opening a tobacco
product package to sell or distribute a single cigarette or any quantity from the package.
See 60 Fed. Reg., supra note 4 at 41315.
141d. at 41314.
15Christina Kent, Tobacco-Control Coup. Proposed FDA Regulation of Tobacco Products,
AM. MED. NEws, Aug. 18,1995, at 1. [hereinafter Kent, Tobacco Control Coup]. The Smoking
and Health, Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health
Service (1%4) claimed that smoking had the potential to cause cancer of esophagus,
larynx, lung, and mouth, as well as chronic bronchitis, emphysema, heart disease and
other illnesses.
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Amendment.16 The lawsuits, filed in federal district court in Greensboro, North
Carolina, are currently pending.
Originally, the proposed rule called for a ninety-day comment period. 17 On
October 16, 1995, however, the FDA extended the comment period for the
proposed rules to January 2,1996.18 The result of the extension was to provide
a comment period of more than 140 days on the notice. Now that the
comment-period has concluded, the FDA under the rulemaking procedures,
must review and develop a final rule based on the recommendations and
comments received. On the final day of comment, the tobacco industry
submitted 47,000 pages of documents which contain arguments on why it is
illegal for the FDA to seek jurisdiction over tobacco products, while also
emphasizing that children and adolescents should not use or have access to
tobacco products. 19 Additionally, the tobacco industry claimed that the FDA's
proposed rule is a transparent first step in pursuit of its real agenda which is a
ban on the sale of cigarettes to adults. 20 No timetable is set to issue a final rule.2 1
The battle between the FDA, who is assisted by tobacco-control groups,22
and the tobacco industry is currently being waged for the "hearts and minds"
16 Coyne Beahm, et al. v. FDA, et al., No. - (M.D.N.C. filed Aug. 11, 1995)(filing as
plaintiffs areR.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; Philip Morris Companies, Inc.; Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp.; Liggett Group Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Co.; and advertising
agency Coyne Beahm). Seealso American Advertising Federation, et al. v. Kessler, et al.,
No. 2:95CV00593 (M.D.N.C. filed Aug. 11, 1995)(filing as plaintiffs are Association of
National Advertisers, Inc.; American Association of Advertising Agencies; Magazine
Publishers of America; Point of Purchase Advertising Institute; American Advertising
Federation; and Outdoor Advertising Association of America, Inc.).
1760 Fed. Reg., supra note 4.
18 Extension of Comment Period, 60 Fed. Reg. 53560 (1995); (extending the
comment-period in response to a 180-day extension request by the Tobacco Institute;
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.; Liggett Group; Philip Morris, Inc.; R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co.; the Smokeless Tobacco Council, Inc.; Conwood Company, L. P.; Whisher
Tobacco Co.; National Tobacco, L.P.; Pinkerton Tobacco Co.; and the U.S. Tobacco Co;
a 90-day extension request by the Food Marketing Institute; and a 9-month extension
request by the Cigar Association of American, Inc.).
19 News Conference, Tobacco Industry's Comments On The FDA Proposed
Regulation of Tobacco Products, Jan. 2 1996 [hereinafter Tobacco Industry News
Conference] (transcript available in LEXIS)(commenting among other arguments that
nopurpose can justify a federal agency's unauthorized intrusion into an area over which
Congress and the States already have jurisdiction and responsibility).
201d.; see also 60 Fed. Reg., supra note 4 at 41355 (claiming the FDA could implement
a total ban of tobaccoproducts if the agency would regulate tobacco under thenew drug
regulations).
21Bamaby J. Feder, Weighing In On Tobacco At the F.D.A., N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1996, at
A7.
22 See Christina Kent, Battle Over FDA Tobacco Regulations: Youth and Smoking, Am.
MED. NEWS, Nov. 6,1995 at 3.[hereinafter Kent, Battle Over] (the Coalition on Smoking
OR Health which consists of the American Cancer Society, American Heart Association,
and the American Lung Association has joined with the AMA, American Academy of
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of the public for support of their own agendas. A number of marketing
techniques are being used by both sides to get their message across to the public
to contact the FDA, members of Congress, and write letters to the editors of
newspapers.23 Also, as one of his seven challenges in his 1996 State of Union
Address, President Clinton challenged the American people to continue to
push to restrict tobacco use among children and adolescents.24
B. Statistics Regarding Tobacco Use Among Children and Adolescents
More than 430,000 individuals die each year from illness related to tobacco
use.25 Tobacco products cause more deaths each year than alcohol, guns, AIDS,
murders, suicides, illegal drugs, automobiles and fires combined. 26 It is the
most preventable method of death. Tobacco use costs our nation fifty billion
dollars in direct health care costs and an estimated forty-five billion dollars in
indirect costs.2 7 Approximately three million children under the age of eighteen
smoke cigarettes every day and one million adolescent males use smokeless
tobacco.28 Moreover, every day three-thousand children and adolescents
become regular new smokers and one-thousand will eventually die as a result
of smoking.29 The younger an individual begins to use tobacco products, the
more likely that individual will become a heavy user of tobacco products as an
adult.30 This is the main reason why FDA Commissioner Kessler labeled
tobacco use as a pediatric disease. If an individual begins using tobacco
products in their youth, there is greater likelihood the habit will continue into
Pediatrics and 125 other organizations to form the "Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids");
see also John Schwartz, Group Targets Tobacco Use Among Youth; Association-Backed Center
Shares Cause With FDA, WASH. PosT, Feb. 12, 1996, at 17 (discussing the new National
Center for Tobacco-Free Kids organization which was created from a Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation grant).
23 Tobacco industry ad in newspapers are inviting readers to call a toll-free number
(800 366-8441) to receive a kit to teach young people how to resist peer pressure to smoke.
Tobacco opponents are using the same marketing tools. For example, the Campaign for
Tobacco Free Kids' ads in major newspapers are urging readers to write to the FDA and
call (800) 284-KIDS for information kits, see Kent, Battle Over, supra note 22.
2 4 State of the Union Address, Clinton's Seven Challenges, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 24,1996, at 9.
25 Surgeon General Report, 1994, supra note 7 (letter from Secretary of Health and
Human Services Donna Shalala to Hon. Thomas Foley, Speaker of the House of
Representatives).
26 Melissa Hough Savage, Selling Tobacco To Minors, NAT'L. CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES
LEcISBRIEF 2 (Sept. 1994).
27 Office on Smoking and Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, State
Tobacco Control Highlights-1996 (1996) at foreword v.
28j.p. Pierce, et al., Trends in Cigarette Smoking in the United States, Projections to the
Year 2000, 261 JAMA 65,66 (1989).
2 9 ld.
30 Surgeon General Report, 1994, supra note 7, at 6.
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adulthood. It is estimated that children and adolescents use anywhere from
5,160,000 to 9,470,000 packs of cigarettes each year.3 1 According to a study on
youth risk behavior, nearly seventy percent of all high school students have
tried cigarettes, and nearly one-third of all high school students used cigarettes
within thirty days of the survey.32 The statistics show that a child's or
adolescent's simple experimentation with tobacco products can lead to
long-term addiction. As further evidence, eighty-two percent of adults who
have used tobacco products began prior to their eighteenth birth date.33
Without question, children and adolescents are heavy users of tobacco
products.
Even though every state prohibits the sale of tobacco products to persons
under the age of eighteen,34 these state laws are not aggressively enforced.35
As a result, children and adolescents have easy access to tobacco products. A
review of thirteen studies of over-the-counter sales found that, on average,
children and adolescents were able to buy tobacco products sixty-seven percent
of the time.36 Also, nine studies which examined illegal vending machine sales
found that children and adolescents were able to purchase tobacco products
on average eighty-eight percent of the time.37
Tobacco products are sold at almost every retail store and are visible almost
everywhere despite an advertising ban on television and radio.38 In fact,
tobacco products are one of the most advertised products in the country.39
Further, the tobacco industry sponsors many sporting events. Sponsorship of
events such as auto races and tennis tournaments associate tobacco products
31J.R.DiFranza &J.B. Tye, Who Profits From Tobacco Sales to Children?, 263 JAMA 2784,
2785 (1990).
32U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance-United
States, 1993, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WxLY REP. 8 (1995); see also President's News
Conference, supra note 1 (stating that one-third more eighth grade students and
one-quarter more tenth grade students are users of tobacco products than four years
ago and one out of five high school seniors is a daily user of tobacco products).
33 Surgeon General Report, 1994, supra note 7, at 65.
34 U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., State Laws on Tobacco Control-United States,
1995,44 MORBIDITY & MORTALnTY WKLY REP. 7 (1995)[hereinafter State Laws].
351d. at 16 (table 3A shows that only 35%of the states have designated an enforcement
authority: ConneticutFlorida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisana, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia).
36Surgeon General Report, 1994, supra note 7, at 249.
371d.
38The ban of advertising cigarettes on television and radio became effective on
January 1,1971 with the enactmentof Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub.
L. No. 91-222, § 6,84 Stat. 87,89 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.S. § 1335 (Law. Co-op.
1991).
39Surgeon General Report, 1994, supra note 7, at 160.
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with excitement and thus promotes tobacco product use. For instance, auto
racing is a nonstop cigarette advertisement despite the ban of tobacco
advertisement on television. A review of the ninety-minute NBC telecast
videotape of the 1989 Marlboro Grand Prix had 5,992 visual and verbal
mentions of the cigarette brand name and logo.40 As noted earlier, the proposed
rule would ban such sponsorship of events to corporate name only, thus,
eliminating sponsor named events such as the Marlboro Grand Prix. Under the
proposed rule, the event would be required to be renamed the Phillip Morris
Grand Prix.
The tobacco industry spent $6.2 billion on advertising, promotions, and
marketing of tobacco products in 1993.41 Many of the tobacco industry
promotional items such as hats and shirts find their way into the hands of
children and adolescents. According to a national phone survey of children age
twelve to seventeen, eleven percent of these children surveyed owned at least
one promotional item from the tobacco industry.42 Also, through mail-order
promotions, the tobacco industry has built a large mailing list of tobacco users.
In the same national survey, 7.6 percent of the children surveyed received
tobacco industry's promotional mailing directly addressed to them.43 It is
estimated that there are 1.6 million teenagers on the tobacco industry's mailing
lists.44
A number of studies reveal that the tobacco industry markets their products
towards children and adolescents. A recent study published in the Journal of
the National Cancer Institute found that marketing of tobacco products is
primarily responsible for the increase in the use of tobacco products among
children and adolescents.4 5 Children and adolescents are more likely to be
influenced by advertising and promotion than by peer pressure.46 The tobacco
industry, however, claims the study to be poorly premised and politically
4012 CoNG. REC. E1943 (daily ed. June 23, 1992)(statement of Rep.
Durbin)(commenting on findings of Alan Blum, founder of Doctors Ought to Care).
4160 Fed. Reg., supra note 4, at 41315 (citing Federal Trade Commission, Report to
Congress for 1993, Pursuant to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, (1995) at
Table 3D (showing that the tobacco industry spent $2.6 billion on financial incentives
to consumers, $1.9 billion on advertising and promotional activities, and $1.6 billion on
retailer sale enhancement allowances).
42 Hooked on Tobacco: The Teen Epidemic, CONSUMER REP., Mar., 1995, at 144.
431d.
44Id.
4 5Samuel S. Gidding, M.D., Kids and Cigs, CHICAGO TRIB., Feb. 10, 1996, at p. 23. See
also News Conference, Report on New Study Detailing the Influence of Cigarette
Advertising on Teens, (Oct. 1995)(transcript available in LEXIS).
4 6Gidding, supra note 45, at 23.
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motivated.47 Instead, the tobacco industry claims the most influencing factor
for children and adolescents to begin tobacco product use is a same sex friend.48
One notable study on tobacco advertising and children revealed that thirty
percent of children age three and ninety-one percent of children age six could
associate the "Joe Camel" cartoon figure 49 with cigarettes.50 Two hundred and
twenty-nine children from preschools in Augusta and Atlanta, Georgia were
instructed to match logos with one of twelve products pictured on a game
board which included children products such as McDonald's and Nike; adult
products such as Ford and NBC; and cigarette brands such as Camel and
Marlboro. The study design was based on the well-accepted market research
concept of advertisement recognition. In the study, the children demonstrated
high rates of logo recognition and recognition levels increased with age. Yet
when the Federal Trade Commission, which ensures advertising of tobacco
products is fair, was asked to ban Joe Camel, the commission declined. 51 The
commission claimed a lack of evidence existed to determine that the ad
campaign directly caused children and adolescents to use tobacco products.5 2
On the other hand, the tobacco industry counters against studies of
advertising and tobacco use among children and adolescents with global
evidence which proves no correlation. For instance, both the countries of
Norway and Finland have had total advertising bans on tobacco since 1975 and
1978, respectively. The bans, however, have had little or no effect on tobacco
use among children and adolescents. In Finland, the rate of tobacco use among
teenagers has not significantly changed, and in Norway the number actually
increased since the enactment of the advertising bans.53 For example, the
Finland proportion of daily smokers among boys age fourteen to eighteen
decreased from twenty-seven percent prior to the ban to twenty-five percent
4 7 Studies Link Ads, Teen Smoking Decisions; Tobacco Industry Calls Premise Political,
DAILY REP. EXECUTIVES, Oct. 18, 1995, at 201.
48 1d. at 202.
4 9 Sheryl Stolbergjoe Camel Leads the Pack in Lighting Up Controversy, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
21,1995, at 1 (citing a Center for Disease Control and Prevention report that prior to the
introduction of Joe Camel in 1988, an estimated three percent of teenagers and 4% adult
smokers used Camel cigarettes, however, five years after the introduction of the Joe
Camel ad campaign, the percentage of adults remained the same while teenage smokers
increased their use to 13% in 1995).
50 P.M. Fischer, etal., Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years, Mickey Mouse
and Old Joe Camel, 266 JAMA 3145 (1991).
51For a commentary on the Federal Trade Commission's refusal to ban "Joe Camel,"
see John Harrington, Up In Smoke: The FTC's Refusal To Apply The "Unfairness Doctrine"
To Camel Cigarette Advertising, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 593 (Apr. 1995).
52 Harry Berkowitz, Joe Camel cigarette ads won't be curbed Tobacco firms win rare victory,
ATLANTAJ. & CoNsr., June 2,1994, at 1; Cf. Stolberg, supra note 49, at I (citing a tobacco
industry study which duplicated Fischer's Joe Camel study found that although 6-year
olds did recognize Joe Camel, 96% of the children disapproved of smoking).
53 DAILY REP. EXECUTIVES, supra note 47.
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in 1993.54 For girls the same age, the number decreased from twenty-six percent
prior to the ban to twenty-three percent in 1993.55 The smoking rate of
Norwegians age sixteen to eighteen, on the other hand, increased between 1990
and 1995 from thirty percent to forty-two percent.56
Studies have also shown far-reaching public support for restrictions on
children and adolescent access to tobacco products. One national survey
published in October, 1994, showed virtually all respondents believed tobacco
use by children and adolescents is a "very serious" or "somewhat serious"
problem.57 Additionally, the survey revealed popular support existed for
vending machine restrictions, imposition of fines on sellers, licensure of
tobacco product vendors, ban of advertising, and an increase of the cigarette
excise tax. 58 Similar results were found in the 1990 Smoking Activity Volunteer
Executed Survey. This adult survey conducted in Arizona, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, and Texas found that more than eighty-two percent of the
respondents believed that stronger laws need to be enacted to prevent children
and adolescents from purchasing tobacco products.5 9 Additionally, more than
eighty-six percent believed that existing laws should be more strictly
enforced.60
According to FDA Commissioner Dr. David Kessler, statistics and studies
like those above were part of the reason for the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction
over these products to place restrictions for children and adolescents. 61 The
proposed rule, as announced by President Clinton, is based on the best
available scientific evidence and findings which show that tobacco products
are harmful, addictive, and marketed to young children and adolescents.62
54id.
551d.
561d.
57 William J. Bailey, et al., A National Survey of Public Support for Restrictions on Youth
Access to Tobacco, 64 J. SCH. HEALTH 314 (Oct. 1994)(finding that survey respondents
believed smoking by children to be "very serious" (64.3%) and "somewhat serious"
(29.3%),and "not at all serious" (0.5%)).
581d. at 315.
59Stephen E. Marcus, et al., Public Attitudes about Cigarette Smoking: Results from the
1990 Smoking Activity Volunteer Executed Survey, 109 Pua. HEALTH REP. 125 (Jan./Feb.
1994)(citing that respondents favored prohibiting the distribution of free tobacco
products (73%); banning advertising in print (60%); and banning sponsorship of
sporting events or advertising at these events (between 49 & 59%).
60 Id.
61FDA Commissioner David Kessler, Address on the President's Initiative to Curb
Smoking by Teenagers at St. Jude's Children's Hospital, Memphis, Tenn. (Oct. 20,1995)
(transcript available in LEXIS).
62 The proposed rule was based upon the findings of the American Medical
Association, the American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, the Ameri-
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C. An Analysis of the FDA's Proposed Jurisdiction Over Tobacco Products: How
the FDA is Making their Case
In determining whether tobacco products may be regulated by the FDA, the
agency put together a compelling case that the nicotine in tobacco products is
a drug and that these products are drug (nicotine) delivery devices. In a
326-page document which is located in the appendix of the proposed rule,6
the FDA addresses the issue of its asserted jurisdiction over
"nicotine-containing tobacco products." The document is the result of
comprehensive investigative and legal analysis which the FDA claims supports
a finding that the nicotine in tobacco products is a drug and these are
drug-delivery devices within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act.64
What is most interesting about the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction comes
from the use of internal documents of the tobacco industry. In essence, the FDA
is using the tobacco industry's own words to determine that tobacco products
are drug delivery devices. For example, in an internal tobacco industry
memorandum, a tobacco company general counsel stated:
Moreover, nicotine is addictive... We are, then, in the business of selling
nicotine, an addictive drug.
65
The tobacco industry's internal documents also reveal that the industry
intended to produce nicotine delivery systems. In 1972, a Philip Morris
executive said:
[t]hink of the cigarette pack as a storage container for a day's supply
of nicotine... [t]hink of the cigarette as a dispenser for a dose unit of
nicotine: ... [t]hink of a puff of smoke as the vehicle of nicotine...
[s]moke is beyond question the most optimized vehicle of nicotine, and
the cigarette the most optimized dispenser of smoke.66
In another internal document, published in the N.Y. Times, an R.J. Reynolds
executive proclaimed:
In a sense the tobacco industry may be thought of as being a
specialized, highly ritualized and stylized segment of the pharmaceu-
can Lung Association, the Centers for Disease Control, and a fourteen-month study by
the FDA. See President's News Conference, supra note 1.
6360 Fed. Reg. at 41453 (citing Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products is
a Drug and These Products are Nicotine-Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Comestic Act, Aug. 1995).
641d. at 41521.
65 1d. at 41611 (citing to a 1963 internal tobacco industry document).
66 1d. at 41617 (citing to a 1972 Philip Morris internal document).
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tical industry. Tobacco products uniquely contain and deliver nicotine,
a potent drug with a variety of physiological effects.
67
The foundation for jurisdiction over tobacco products is taken directly from the
tobacco industry's own words. There are striking similarities to the tobacco
industry's internal comments and the FDA's legal analysis to assert jurisdiction
over tobacco products.
In response, the tobacco industry has asserted that the FDA has utilized
improper methods to reveal that the agency has jurisdiction over tobacco
products. The industry claims the entire rule making has been fatally tainted
by the agency's reliance on secret data provided by biased sources. 68 The
tobacco industry also has claimed that the FDA has utilized confidential
documents which include many unpublished studies and other materials
which the FDA refuses to disclose.
While the tobacco industry has not outright disputed the published internal
documents, the industry has downplayed their impact which is consistent with
the tobacco industry's usual response to such documents. For example, internal
tobacco documents have been used in prior court proceedings concerning
health-related suits, and according to a Philip Morris spokesperson, "when
documents that are sensationalized in the press find their way into the
courtroom, juries have failed to find them to be evidence of wrongdoing."69
D. FDA's Legal Argumentfor Authority
According to the FDA, the results of their inquiry of nicotine support a
finding that because nicotine in tobacco products is "intended to affect the
structure or function of the body and it achieves its intended effects through
chemical action within the human body"70 it may be regulated as a device
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.71 The FDA is labeling
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco as "drug-delivery devices." The FDA is
asserting that tobacco products, as a drug-delivery system, purpose is to deliver
nicotine to the body in a method which is most readily absorbed by the
consumer.72 Obviously, the FDA's contention is not without criticism,
especially by the tobacco industry. One commentator called the labeling of
6760 Fed. Reg. at 41618 (citing to PJ Hilts, U.S. Convenes Grand Jury to Look at Tobacco
Industry, N.Y. TMES, July 26,1995).
68Tobacco Industry News Conference, supra note 19.
69American Political Network, Focus on Tobacco Industry Under Fire: More
Whistleblowers Come Forward, 4 AM. HEALTHLINE 236, Mar. 19, 1996 (citing All Things
Considered, NPR, 3/18).
7060 Fed. Reg., supra note 4, at 41521.
711d. (citing 21 U.s.cs. § § 321(g)(1)(C), 321(h)(3) as authority for the regulation of
tobacco products).
721d.
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tobacco products as nicotine delivery devices is like labeling Scotch as an
ethanol-delivery device or coffee as a caffeine-delivery device.73
Under the proposed rule, tobacco products would be regulated as a
combination product under the device regulations, not solely as a drug.74 Title
21 Code of Federal Rules 3.2 (e) provides the definition of combination product.
It provides in pertinent part:
(e) Combination product includes:
(1) a product comprised of two or more regulated components, i.e.,
drug/device, drug/biologic, or drug/device/biologic, that are
physically, chemically, or otherwise combined or mixed and produced
as a single entity;
(2) Two or more separate products packaged together in a single
package or as a unit and comprised of drug and device products,
device and biological products, or biological and drug products;
(3) A drug, device, or biological product packaged separately that
according to its investigational plan or proposed labeling is intended
for use only with an approved individually specified drug, device, or
biological product where both are required to achieve the intended use,
indication, or effect and where upon approval of the proposed product
the labeling of the approved product would need to be changed ....
According to the FDA, tobacco products are combination products over
which the FDA has discretion to regulate using drug authorities, device
authorities, or a combination of both authorities pursuant to the Safe Medical
Device Act of 1990 which amended the Food, Drug, and Comestic Act. The 1990
Act recognized the need for additional regulations of products that constitute
a combination or a drug, device or biological product.75 The 1990 Act, codified
at 21 U.S.C.S. § 353 (g) governs these regulations. 21 U.S.C.S. § 353(g) provides
in part that.
(1) The Secretary shall designate a component of the Food and Drug
Administration to regulate products that constitute a combination of
a drug, device, or biological product. The Secretary shall determine the
primary mode of action of the combination product.
On the other hand, if the FDA were to regulate tobacco products pursuant
to the new drug authority, tobacco products would not be approved, and
accordingly, the FDA could remove tobacco products from the market.76 The
73 Jacob Sullum, The War On Tobacco Smoking Regulations Go Way Too Far, SAN DIEGo
UNION-TRIB., Aug. 20, 1995, at C-1.
7460 Fed. Reg. at 41348-49.
75 d. at 41521(citing 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(e) (1994) as authority to regulate tobacco
products).
76 d. at 41348 (authorizing tobacco products removal pursuant to 21 U.s.cs. 331(d)
(Law. Co-op 1993) which prohibits the introduction or delivery for introduction into
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"new drug" provisions would require that tobacco products are generally
recognized as safe and effective. 21 U.S.C.S § 321 (p)(1) defines "new drug" in
pertinent part as:
Any drug the composition of which is such that such drug is not
generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training
and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe
and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended,
or suggested in the labeling thereof....
According to the FDA, tobacco products would not be considered safe and
effect under the agency's new drug application process. Thus, the agency
would be required to remove the products from the market because the
evidence on tobacco products' effects on health proves that the products are
not safe for its intended use. 21 U.S.CS. § 355 (a) governs the new drug
provisions which provide in pertinent part that:
Necessity of effective approval of application. No person shall
introduce or deliver into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an
approval of an application filed pursuant to subsection (b) is effective
with respect to such drugs.
The FDA, however, believes that a total ban on all tobacco products would
not be in the best interests of the public health at this time.77 Nevertheless, the
FDA believes that because of the dangerous health consequences from using
tobacco products, aggressive initiatives must be taken to prevent future
generations from using and becoming addicted to tobacco products.78
Instead of a complete ban on tobacco products, the FDA proposes to make
these products subject to regulation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act's device authorities to allow the continued marketing of the products. 79
The Act's definition of device is statutory and the courts have upheld a broad
construction of its meaning.80 The FDA is attempting to include tobacco
interstate commerce of any article without meeting approval of new drug standards. 21
U.S.C.S. 355(a) (Law. Co-op 1993) governs new drug applications which must be safe
for its intended use).
77 d. at 41348-49 (citing reasons for not banning tobacco products as: (1) high
addiction rates and difficulties to quit may cause adverse health consequences; (2)
current health care system may not be able to provide adequate treatment for
withdrawal; and (3) not unreasonable to assume a black market or smuggling would
develop).
7860 Fed. Reg. at 41350.
791d. at 41349.
80See e.g., United States v. An Undetermined Number of Unlabeled Cases 21 F.3d
1026, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994)(the Act regulates as a "device" an article intended for use in
diagnosis regardless of whether medical treatment will follow); United States v. 22
Rectangular Devices, 714 F. Supp. 1159, 1162 n.7 (D. Utah 1989)(listing examples of
devices such as facial exerciser, electric acupuncture instrument, phonographic records
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products within the meaning of device. The Medical Device Manufacturers'
Association, however, has submitted a statement in opposition to the proposed
rule.81 The Medical Device Manufacturers Association represents one hundred
small to medium sized domestic medical device manufacturers. In fact,
ninety-eight percent of the medical device industry consist of companies with
less than five hundred employees and seventy-two percent have less than fifty
employees.
In terms of tobacco products, the FDA is claiming that these products
function like other drug delivery systems such as pre-filled inhalers,
transdermal patches,82 and metered-dose inhalers.&3 The tobacco product
contains the drug nicotine and is used to deliver the drug to the area of the
body where it will be absorbed. The area is the lungs for cigarettes, while for
smokeless tobacco the area is the mouth. After the drug is received into the
body, the cigarette butt or the tobacco material is depleted of the drug and then
discarded by the user. The FDAasserts that "only the nicotine delivered by these
products achieves its primary intended purpose by chemical action in or on
the body."84
Based on the above analysis, the FDA is proposing to regulate tobacco
products as "restricted devices" in order to place restrictions on tobacco
products. 85 The restricted device authority provision allows the FDA to issue
regulations restricting the sale, distribution, or use of a device "if, because of its
potentiality for harmful effect or the collateral measures necessary to its use,
the Secretary determines that there cannot otherwise be reasonable assurance
of its safety and effectiveness."86 The FDA has determined that there is no
reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of tobacco products and
that additional restrictions are needed to prevent a new generation of children
and adolescents from becoming addicted to tobacco products. 8 7 The
regulations are specifically aimed at children and adolescents because, as noted
earlier, the use of tobacco products usually begins during childhood.
used in treating insomnia, and a cabinet producing lights similar to neon lights used in
treating various medical disorders).
8 1Tobacco Industry News Conference, supra note 19 (discussing the Medical Device
Manufacturers' Association of American's statement).
82A nicotine patch is an example of a transdermal patch. The difference between
nicotine patches and tobacco products is there are therapeutic claims made in the
marketing of the patches which allows for FDA regulation. No similar claim is made
for tobacco products. Id. Nicotine patch is currently available as an
over-the-counter-drug.
8360 Fed. Reg. at 41347.
841d.
8 5 1d. at 41349.
8 61d. (citing, Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, § 520(e)(1)(B)).
8760 Fed. Reg. at 41350.
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Accordingly, the FDA is proposing to regulate tobacco products pursuant to its
restricted device authority which will afford the most appropriate and flexible
mechanism for regulating these products and fits better with the aims of the
proposed rule.88
In response, the tobacco industry claims that the FDA, through
jurisprudential gymnastics, has concocted an unauthorized and
unprecedented structure under which tobacco products are drugs but will be
regulated as medical devices.89 Furthermore, the tobacco industry has argued
that the nicotine in the average cigarette today is lower than ever. The tobacco
industry cites that the average nicotine level in cigarettes decreased from 2.6
milligrams to 0.89 milligrams from 1954 to 1993.90
It should be noted that no where in the FDA's use of statutory authority is
there any expression of congressional intent to have tobacco products within
the meaning of devices or to have the FDA assume regulatory authority over
tobacco products. However, courts must interpret the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act broadly to aid in protecting public health.91
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE FDA'S UNILATERAL ATTEMPT TO ASSERT
JURISDICTION OVER TOBACCO PRODUCTS
A. Constitutional Problems
Article One, Section Seven, Clause Two of the U.S. Constitution provides that
"[elvery Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President of the United
States" who may veto the bill or approve it.92 This provision and Clause Three,
make-up the bicameralism and presentment requirements for law-making
under the U.S. Constitution. The FDA asserts that new evidence reveals that
nicotine is a drug and tobacco products are drug delivery devices. The FDA,
therefore, may regulate tobacco products under existing statutes. Congress,
however, has never specifically delegated such regulatory authority to the FDA
through legislation. The issue of whether FDA should have jurisdiction to
regulate tobacco products has been raised numerous times in Congress, but
Congress has determined each and every time that the agency should not have
88 1d. at 41347.
89 Tobacco Industry News Conference, supra note 19.
90 Statement of Charles 0. Whitley on behalf of the Tobacco Institute before the
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment House Energy and Commerce
Committee, Mar. 25,1995.
9 1 See U.S. v. Undetermined No. of Unlabeled Cases, 21 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 1994);
U.S. v. Two Plastic Drums, More or Less of an Article of Food, Labeled in Part: Viponte
Ltd. Black Currant Oil Batch No. BOOSF 039, 761 F.Supp. 70, affirmed 984 F.2d 814,
rehearing denied (7th Cir. 1991).
92 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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jurisdiction.93 In fact, Congress has never delegated any type of tobacco
regulatory activities to the FDA, including reporting responsibilities. 94 In
delegating aspects of tobacco regulatory authority to various agencies,
Congress has taken specific action through legislation. Congress has never
given any duties to the FDA over tobacco products. Although Congress has
delegated broad authority to the FDA over drugs, devices, and combination
products, the language and intent was never to include tobacco products. In
fact, according to the 1989 testimony of FDA Chief Counsel Thomas Scarlett
before a Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on the possible
regulation of tobacco products under the Federal Food, Drug and Comestic
Act, he asserted that "the act draws the lines and we have to respect them ....
What is fairly important in FDA law is whether a product has a therapeutic
purpose, at least if you are talking about something that might be a drug.'95
The absence of Congress delegating authority to the FDA is one of the main
arguments claimed by the tobacco industry against the proposed rule. The
tobacco industry claims that when the FDA asserted jurisdiction, it was an
illegal power grab on the part of that Agency.96 Further, the federal courts have
previously agreed that the FDA has no jurisdiction over tobacco products
absent a therapeutic claim by the tobacco industry.97 The tobacco industry has
never made such a claim. In ASH v. Harris,98 the Federal District of Columbia
93 The following are examples of some of the legislation which has been introduced
to grant jurisdiction over tobacco products to FDA. Each piece of legislation was not
enacted: H.R. 11280,84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); H.R. 5973,88th Cong., 1st Sess (1963);
H.R. 2448,89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 1484,97th Cong., 1st Sess.(1987); S. 769,97th
Cong., 1st Sess.(1987); H.R. 4350, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 2298, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess.(1992); H.R. 2147, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); and S. 672, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993).
94See e.g., 26 U.S.C.S. § 5701(b) (Law. Co-op. 1995)(authorizing the Internal Revenue
Service to implement cigarette sales tax collection); 15 U.S.C.S. § 1335a (Law. Co-op.
1993)(authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to review list of
ingredients in tobacco products and report to Congress on health effects from those
added ingredients); 15 U.S.C.S. § 1333(c) (Law. Co-op. 1993)(authorizing the Federal
Trade Commission to implement the congressional mandated warnings on tobacco
products labels); 15 U.S.C.S. § 1341(a) (Law. Co-op. 1993)(authorizing the Department
of Health and Human Services to conduct extensive research on the health effects of
tobacco product use report findings to Congress); 15 U.S.C.S. § 1337(b) (Law. Co-op.
1993)(authorizing the Federal Trade Commission to submit an annual report to
Congress on cigarette advertising practices and methods which may include
recommendations to restrict such advertising); 15 U.S.C.S. 1341(b) (Law. Co-op.
1993)(requiring the Interagency Committee on Smoking and Health to submit biennial
reports to Congress on activities undertaken to inform the public about tobaccoproduct
use risks).
9SHearings before the Subcomm. on Rural Development, Agriculture, and Related Agencies,
of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., part 8, at 409 (1989).
9 6Tobacco Industry News Conference, supra note 19.
9 7ASH v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
981d.
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Appellate Court upheld a ruling that the FDA does not have jurisdiction over
cigarettes containing nicotine and that proper deference should be given to
Congress. The case arose from the Action on Smoking OR Health's petition
which challenged the FDA's refusal to assert jurisdiction over cigarettes
containing nicotine as a drug or device.
Even FDA Commissioner Kessler had the long-standing position that the
agency could not regulate tobacco products without direction from Congress.99
However, the evidence revealed from internal documents of tobacco industry
may show misrepresentations on their part and aid the FDA's argument.
Although this may help justify the FDA's assertion over tobacco products, it is
not enough. Congressional action is still required to have the FDA assert
jurisdiction over tobacco product. If the FDA were able to assume jurisdiction
without approval by Congress, it would dampen the integrity of the
Constitutional framework of our system of government. One member of
Congress, in response to the proposed rule, argued that "a precedent must not
be set whereby a federal bureaucrat [Commissioner Kessler], in contravention
of the Constitution, can carve out for himself and his agency, rights and
prerogatives specifically reserved by the Constitution to the Congress and the
states."100
In his announcement of the executive action and in repeated follow-up
commentary, President Clinton has said that he would prefer if Congress were
to meet the same goals through legislation, thus, rendering the lengthy
rulemaking procedure unnecessary.101 A possible underlying reason of the
President's expressed efforts for Congress to act is that it is for Congress to
decide whether such authority is provided to the FDA. Nevertheless, both the
President and FDA Commissioner Kessler believe the case for FDAjurisdiction
over tobacco products is solid because of the mounting evidence which alleges
that the tobacco industry previously knew that nicotine was addictive and that
the industry may have manipulated the level of nicotine in tobacco products.
99 Compare Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 1), Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 73 (1994)(Commissioner Kessler commenting that the FDA would need
congressional direction before asserting jurisdiction over tobacco products). with
Margaret Ebrahim, Will Washington kick tobacco? Clinton's war on smoking, NATION, Apr.
25,1994, at p. 555 (discussing Commissioner Kessler's correspondence to the Coalition
on Smoking OR Health which commented that the growing body of data suggests that
tobacco industry intended that many people buy cigarettes to satisfy their nicotine
addiction and should the agency make this finding based on an appropriate record or
be able to prove these facts in court, it would have a legal basis on which to regulate
these products under the drug provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act).
100142 CONG. REC. E172 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1996)(statement of Rep. Tanner).
101 See, e.g. President's News Conference, supra, note 1.; Interview With Tabitha Soren
of MTV, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1426 (Aug. 11, 1995); The President's
Radio-Address, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1440 (Aug. 12, 1995); Radio Town Hall
Meeting With The President on Larry King (Westwood One Radio Broadcast, Sept. 21,
1995)(transcript available in LEXIS).
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If the case for FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products was not politically
feasible and to a lessor degree, legally through administrative law, then the
proposed rule would have never been introduced by the President.
Furthermore, President Clinton is the first president to stand up against the
tobacco industry, a political heavyweight.
However, if the introduced legislation in response to the proposed rule is
any indication, the movement in Congress seems to be against authorizing
jurisdiction over tobacco products to the FDA. The legislation introduced in
response to the proposed rule is to specifically prohibit the FDA from regulating
tobacco products. 102 The only legislation introduced in the One-Hundred and
Fourth Congress to grant any type of authorization to the FDA is the Freedom
From Nicotine Addiction Act of 1995.103 The legislation, however, was
introduced in June, 1995 prior to the announcement of the proposed rule.
In addition, the FDA's attempted assertion of jurisdiction is contrary to the
intent of Congress because that legislative body has specifically enacted
legislation to govern the regulation of tobacco products for children and
adolescents. In 1992, by enacting the Synar Amendment,104 Congress delegated
such regulatory authority to the states. The Synar Amendment requires states
to enact legislation which prohibits the sale or distribution of tobacco products
to individuals under the age of eighteen in order for states to receive federal
mental health and substance abuse block grant funds.105 The states are required
1 02 The following bills were introduced in response to the FDA's proposed rule: H.R.
2414, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)(establishing federal authority to regulate tobacco
products as a condition to the receipt by State of the Federal health services block grant
by requiring stricter state restrictions and declaring that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services does not have any authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Comestic Act); H.R. 2283,104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)(prohibiting the regulation of the
sale or use of tobacco products by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Comestic Act and repealing any regulation issued by the
FDA); S. 1262, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)(establishing certain limitations on tobacco
product advertisements and increased enforcement of law relating to underage tobacco
use and prohibit the FDA to regulate in any manner tobacco products.); S. 1295, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) & H.R. 2265 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)(prohibiting the
regulation of any tobacco sponsored advertising of any professional motorsports
association by the Secretary of Health and Human Services or any other agency of the
Federal Government); H.R. 2585, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)(amending the Internal
Revenue Code to increase the excise taxes on smokeless tobacco to an amount equivalent
to the tax on cigarettes and to use the revenues for a trust fund for smokeless tobacco
use reduction programs).
103 H.R. 1853, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)(amending the Federal Food, Drug, and
Comestic Act to require the reduction and eventual elimination of nicotine in tobacco
products and making it unlawful to deliver into interstate commerce a tobacco product
with a nicotine content over specified limits).
104The Synar Amendment is named after former Representative Mike Synar who died
inJanuary, 1996 of cancer at the age of 45. Synar, a tobacco-control advocate, introduced
the amendment to § 126 of the Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 102-321, § 202,106
Stat. 394 (1992), codified as 42 U.S.C.S. § 300x-26 (Law. Co-op. upp. 1995).
10 5 Surgeon General Report, 1994, supra note 7, at 213.
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to enforce these minor restriction laws in a manner "that can reasonably be
expected to reduce the extent to which tobacco products are available to
individuals under the age of 18."106 The Synar Amendment also requires states
to use random, unannounced operations to ensure compliance and submit
reports on enforcement activities to the Department of Health and Human
Services (hereinafter "DHHS").107 A state's failure to comply with the Synar
Amendment will result in the loss of federal grant money for drug and alcohol
abuse.108 In response to the Synar Amendment, all fifty States now have
statutes which prohibit tobacco sales to individuals under the age of
eighteen. 109
On January 19, 1996, the DIIHS issued a final rule, "Substance Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Block Grants: Sale or Distribution of Tobacco
Products to Individuals Under 18 Years of Age," in the Federal Register in order
to implement the Synar Amendment.11 0 The final rule was issued more than
two years after the initial proposed rule was published.111 The proposed rule
of the Synar Amendment issued in 1993 required states to demonstrate that
each state was steadily reducing by twenty percent, over a four year period,
the success rate of attempted purchases by children and adolescents under the
age of eighteen in the random, unannounced inspections. The final rule issued,
however, establishes that the Secretary of DHHS will negotiate a strategy with
each state for achieving the performance objective over a period of several
years. 112 This change eliminated the proposed "one-size-fits-all" standard for
the states. The main reason for the change was that not all states have the same
ability and enforcement resources. 113
10642 U.S.C.S. § 300x-26(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
10 7Surgeon General Report, 1994 supra note 7 at 213.
1081d.
109Seee.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-27-277 (Michie 1993); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22952
(Deering Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-344 (1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 569.007 (Supp.
1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-10 (West Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE § 453A.2 (Supp. 1995);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555 (West Supp. 1995); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 64C, § 10
(Law. Co-op 1988); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 722.641 (Callaghan 1993); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 1399-cc (Consol. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.02 (Anderson 1993); OR. REV.
STAT. 163.575 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1502 (Michie Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE
§ 16-9A-2 (1995); WIS. STAT. § 134.66 (1989); WYo. STAT. § 14-3-302 (1994).
1OSee Tobacco Regulation for Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block
Grants, 61 Fed. Reg. 1492 (1996)[hereinafter 61 Fed. Reg.] (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §
96).
1 1 1The notice of the proposed rule was published in the Federal Register on August
26,1993 at 58 Fed. Reg. 55156.
11261 Fed. Reg. at 1499.
1131d.
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According to the DHHS, the final rule will complement and be consistent
with any rule the FDA may issue.114 The final rule is directed to the states, while
the FDA proposed rule focuses on the tobacco industry and retailers. The
DHHS states, the regulatory approaches reflect major differences in the
statutory authorities of the respective agencies.115 The Synar Amendment rule,
however, is authorized by Congress while the FDA proposal is without any
Congressional approval. This is the major difference in the regulatory
approaches.
B. Federalism Principles
Congress' regulatory approach toward tobacco product use restrictions for
children and adolescents [Synar Amendment] is consistent with current
notions of federalism and the Tenth Amendment.1 6 One interpretation of
federalism is "that states are entitled to be different - to have different views
about the best solutions to their problems and even to have different views
about what is a problem and what is not."117 Additionally, this past year
marked a renewed interest in the Tenth Amendment and returning power back
to the states.118 Two main factors can be attributed to the renewed interest, first,
general hostility towards the federal government, i.e. 'big government," and
second, the idea that problems are best solved by those closest to the problem,
state and local governments. 119
The Synar Amendment and the final rule reflect this governing philosophy
and concept. The rule gives States flexibility to devise their own enforcement
methods in a manner that can reasonably be expected to reduce the availability
of tobacco products to children and adolescent in light of each State's unique
circumstances. 120 The Synar Amendment and the final rule are minimum
requirements for which the States must adhere to receive federal grant funds.121
While many tobacco-control advocates have argued that state laws regulating
1 14 1d.
1151d.
116 The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
117 William W. Bishop, Reflections on United States v. Lopez: How To Think About The
Federal Commerce Power And Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV.
554,558 (Dec. 1995).
118See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)(striking down a federal statute as
beyond the commerce power of the federal government for the first time in sixty years).
119141 CONG. REC. E1707 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1995)(statement of Rep. Hamilton on the
Tenth Amendment).
12061 Fed. Reg. at 1495.
1211d. at 1496.
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tobacco use by children and adolescents are rarely enforced, 122 the final rule of
the Synar Amendment provides incentives, guidance, and assistance for the
states to become more involved in a national, comprehensive Congressional
program. In short, the guidance provided by the Synar Amendment is the final
rule which contains provisions for the states to adhere to in order to receive
federal funding; while federal assistance is the funds for enforcement of state
tobacco control measures. More specifically, the Synar Amendment requires
states to enforce their laws limiting access to tobacco products by children and
adolescents and to designate an agency or office to coordinate compliance
activities of the Synar Amendment rule. Further, under the Synar Amendment
rule, the federal funds provided to the states may be used for state enforcement
programs. However, if a state failed to comply with the federal standards, then
their funds would be withheld and provided to other states which have
complied with the Synar Amendment rule. The final rule also requires states
to annually submit to the federal government a report which describe the
strategies and activities of the state enforce their laws. The rule also
"encourages" states to allow localities to enact stricter laws or more rigorous
enforcement of tobacco control measures.
The results of the final rule should be given an opportunity to see how much
the rule will reduce tobacco use among children and adolescents before
creating additional federal bureaucracies to oversee the states' responsibilities.
On the other hand, the FDA proposed rule is contrary to federalism notions.
When many federal agencies are downsized and the era of big government is
purportedly over,123 the proposed rule seeks to expand the scope and mission
of the FDA. Without Congressional authority, the FDA is attempting to pursue
its own federal policy to place restrictions on tobacco products for children and
adolescents. The attempt to assert its jurisdiction comes at a time when the FDA
has received much criticism that it cannot handle its already existing regulatory
responsibilities such as timely drug testing and approval. According to 1992
figures, only one out of five-thousand drugs complete the regulatory process
of laboratory to FDA approval with an approval cycle averaging twelve
years. 124 Such statistics prompted a movement toward a total restructure of the
122Report: States Not Enforcing Teen Tobacco Ban, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 26,1995,
at 5.
123President Clinton in his 1996 State of the Union Address proclaimed on three
different occasions that the era of big government is over. See Address Before A Joint
Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 32 WKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 90 (Jan. 3,
1996).
124 Carolyn Lochhead, Deadly Over-Caution, FDA Assailed For Slow Testing Of New
Drugs, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 26, 1992 (citing Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association's
study of drug development); see also Lee Bowman, FDA's Drug Export Law Under
Congressional Fire, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 20, 1995, at 4A (discussing a law enacted to
enhance U.S. medical exports, but FDA is instead delaying approval by months and
years for companies to ship drugs and devices overseas if the drug or device has not
already been approved for domestic use); Marlene Cimons, FDA's Generic-Drug Reviews
Criticized, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25,1989, at 16 (citing a report issued by the inspector general
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FDA. 125 Also, criticism has been specifically directed at Commissioner Kessler.
Claims are that he is not a team player in that he follows his own agenda with
a headline-grabbing style, and that his slow, overly cautious philosophy, with
moments of inappropriate regulatory zeal, restricts access to life-saving
therapies while increasing medication and health care costs. 1 2 6
If the FDA cannot handle existing responsibilities, then how can the agency
tackle the added responsibility of tobacco product regulations in an adequate
manner.127 Moreover, the proposed rule lacks an effective enforcement
mechanism. In fact, the FDA admits that the regulations essentially would be
self-enforcing.128
The states and localities are in a better position to prevent tobacco product
use among children and adolescents without federal bureaucratic intervention.
Nevertheless, the attorney generals of twenty-seven states wrote to FDA
Commissioner Kessler supporting the proposed rule and insisted that a
cooperative effort, including federal regulations, was necessary to prevent
tobacco use by children and adolescents.129 The correspondence was the efforts
of the National Association of Attorneys General whose membership consists
of the fifty states' attorney generals. The twenty-seven attorney generals'
supportive correspondence of federal intervention comes at a time when many
states are currently suing the tobacco industry to recover payment for Medicaid
and Medicare expenses for tobacco-related illnesses. Nevertheless, even
without additional federal government assistance, a cooperative effort
currently exists under federal and state law through the Synar Amendment.
Additional federal intrusion is not necessary until Congress makes that
determination.
The determination of whether FDA has any authority to restrict tobacco use
must be made by Congress. Congress has delegated such authority to the states
and localities. In terms of federalism, the states and local governments should
retain regulatory responsibility while improving enforcement of existing
tobacco product restriction laws. An aggressive approach by the states and
local governments would resolve many of the problems associated with
of the DHHS that the FDA lacks sufficient internal controls over generic drug review
procedures to maintain its integrity).
125 Peter Stone, Ganging Up On The FDA, NAT'L. J., Feb. 18, 1995 (discussing a new
coalition of industry critics, conservative groups and powerful Republican lawmakers
to work for a major restructuring of the FDA).
126James P. Driscol, et al, We Need An FDA Leader, Not A Regulatory Czar, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 10,1993, at B7.
127141 CONG. REc. E1736 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1995)(statement of Rep. Payne).
12 8Kent, Tobacco Control.Coup, supra note 15 (citing to a FDA spokesperson that if a
tobacco agent were to see prohibited material during a retail store visit, the agent would
be responsible for its removal).
12 9Marlene Cimons, Cigarette Regulation Plan Challenged, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 3, 1996, at
All.
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children and adolescent use of tobacco products without unnecessary federal
government intrusion. The regulating of tobacco use among children and
adolescents is the states' responsibility, not the federal government's.
IV. How THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY CONTROLS THE POLITICAL AGENDA FOR
TOBACCO CONTROL INITIATIVES
A. Federal Government
During the announcement of the proposed rule, President Clinton indirectly
conceded that his assault against the tobacco industry on behalf of children and
adolescents may be a political risk for him, especially in the South after he
rejected an enforceable, voluntary agreement.130 President Clinton had
considered a compromise proposal with the tobacco industry where the
industry would support efforts to fight tobacco use among children and
adolescents in exchange for no regulations. After failing to reach an agreement,
the President subsequently announced the FDA proposed rule. In reality, it is
doubtful President Clinton will suffer any political fallout, even in tobacco
producing states.131 Instead President Clinton may gain national support
because statistics reveal that the public, including individuals from
tobacco-growing states, supports further restrictions on tobacco use by
children and adolescents. 13 2 Also, in a public opinion poll conducted after the
announcement, eighty-six percent of adults said yes when asked "should your
Congress member support the FDA proposed rule."133 Indeed, the FDA
proposed rule may have been drafted to meet the level of tobacco regulation
that the public will support. More than likely, the President's political
advisers(probably more so than his policy advisers) played a significant role in
deciding to go forward with the FDA proposed rule. Therefore, President
Clinton may not risk anything politically, but may gain support for his actions.
The question arises, if the public is supportive of further restrictions on
tobacco products for children and adolescents, then why has not Congress
enacted tougher initiatives or provided the FDA with the authority to regulate
cigarettes. The tobacco industry lobby provides most of the answer.
130President's News Conference, supra note 1.
131President Clinton won three of the six largest tobacco producing states: Kentucky,
Tennessee, and by only 5,000 votes Georgia in 1992 Election. See Ron Foumier, President
Foregoing Fortunes in South, RECORDER, Aug. 11, 1995, at A10.
132For the level of public support for restrictions on tobacco products for children and
adolescents. See, Marcus, supra note 59 and accompanying text; Baileysupra note 57 and
accompanying text.
133News Conference, House Members Hold News Conference To Support The
President's Plan To Regulate Tobacco For Children, Sept. 29,1995 (transcript available
in LEXIS).
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Tobacco is a major agricultural crop in the United States and the tobacco
industry accounts for more than 680,000 jobs. 134 The tobacco industry's
lobbying efforts are conducted by the Tobacco Institute which has controlled
potential tobacco restrictions through a sophisticated lobbying scheme. 135 The
tobacco lobby employs a number of former Congressional members as
lobbyists.136 In addition to former Congressional members, the tobacco
industry's lobbyists include many attorneys who previously were employed
in the highest legal positions at the FDA. 137 According to a 1993 report, the
tobacco lobby has ensured that members of Congress rarely have to actually
vote against tobacco control legislation because the industry "quietly kills" such
initiatives in various committees without much media attention. 138
The tobacco industry's real source of strength is political campaign
contributions. For example, according to a 1995 Common Cause study, from
1989 to 1994, seventy-three percent of senators accepted campaign
contributions from the tobacco industry and sixty-six percent of House
members accepted tobacco industry's campaign contributions in the 1994
election. 139 The tobacco industry has contributed more than 16.6 million dollars
to federal candidates, political action committees, and political party
committees since 1985.140 During the period of 1993 to 1995, the tobacco
industry gave almost $2 million in "soft money "14 1 contributions to Republican
134 Hank Cox, Feds and Smokers Fume Over the Right to Inhale, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 24,
1995, at 14 (citing to a 1992 Price Waterhouse Study).
135Matthew Baldini, Note, The Cigarette Battle: Anti-smoking Proponents Go For the
Knockout, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 348, 351 (1995).
136Vicki Kemper, The Inhalers; They May Not Smoke Tobacco Products, But Some In
Congress Are Addicted to the Industry's Money, COMMON CAUSE MAG., Jan./ Feb./ Mar.
1995.
137The former FDA attorneys employed with the tobacco industry include: Richard
Merrill, former chief counsel the during Carter Administration; Richard Cooper, former
chief counsel; Thomas Scarlett, former chief counsel during the Reagan Administration;
Arthur Levine, former deputy general counsel of litigation from 1978-91; and Donald
Beers, former associate chief counsel for enforcement from 1978-85. See Milo Geyelin,
Tobacco Industry Gets Help From Ex- FDA Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16,1995.
138Carol Jouzaitis, Under Fire, Tobacco Lobby Still Can Counterattack- Industry Enjoys
Many Allies On Capitol Hill, CHICAGO TRIB., June 16, 1994 (citing a 1993 Public Citizen
and Advocacy Institute Report on the tobacco lobby).
139Kemper, supra note 136.
140 Id.
141 "Soft money" describes campaign contributions raised from sources that, if given
directly to candidates, are illegal in federal elections. The campaign contributions are
channeled to state political party organizations, and spent by the state parties on election
activities. The soft money exception is a loophole which political parties have used to
their full advantage. See Clarisa Long, Note, Shouting Down the Voice of the People: Political
Parties, Powerful PACs, and Concerns About Corruption, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1161,1167 (May,
1994).
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party committees.1 42 Further, since 1985, the eleven tobacco political action
committees have contributed more than 10.6 million dollars to federal
candidates and political action committees. 143
More recently, the tobacco industry increased their contributions to
Republicans last year which reflects a new, more partisan effort as the industry
lobbys against the Clinton Administration and the FDA proposed rule. In fact,
tobacco industry "soft money" contributions were nearly 2.3 million dollars in
1995.144 Philip Morris and RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp. contributed 1.7 million
dollars to Republicans which is nearly twice the amount contributed to
Republicans in 1994.145 On the other side of the political fence, Democrats, who
previously received support from the tobacco industry, have received a much
smaller amount. For example, the RJR Nabisco political action committee's
overall contribution in 1995 was a twenty-seven percent increase from the
previous year; yet the amount contributed to Democrats in 1995 was half the
amount received the Democrats received in 1994.146
In addition to political action committees, tobacco executives make large
political contributions out of their own pockets. Since 1989, fifteen executives
have contributed 162,700 dollars to federal candidates, leadership political
action committees and party committees and 169,840 dollars to tobacco
industry political action committees. 14 7
According to the Common Cause study, Congress ignores the public health
aspects of tobacco use and public opinion polls because it is the tobacco
industry rather than the public that rewards or punishes Congress for their
votes on tobacco control initiatives. 148 The political cost of challenging tobacco
interests is the loss of an easy source of campaign contributions and an increase
to a challenger. A study in the Joumal of American Medical Association found
that nothing influences tobacco legislation votes by Congress more than
tobacco industry campaign funds.149 The study determined that House
members receiving the most tobacco contributions were fourteen times as
likely to vote with the tobacco industry as opposed to a member receiving less
contributions, and Senate members who received the most contributions were
142 Kemper, supra note 136.
1 4 3 Id.
14 4 David Rogers, Tobacco Companies Boost Contributions To the GOP, While Democrats
Get Less, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1996, at B6.
1 45 Id.
1461d.
14 7 Rogers, supra note 144, at B6.
148 Kemper, supra note 136.
14 9Stephen Moore, et al., Epidemiology of Failed Tobacco Control Legislation, 272 JAMA
1171 (Oct. 19, 1994).
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forty-two times more likely to vote with the tobacco industry.150 This study
demonstrated a consistent and strong relationship between the amount of
tobacco contributions received and a Congress member's position on tobacco
control legislation. The more contributions received, the less likely the
Congressperson would support tobacco control measures. Additionally,
Republicans and Congress members representing tobacco producing states
were also less likely to support such legislation. The strength and consistency
of belonging to the Republican Party and representing a tobacco producing
state, though, still did not have the impact as the amount of tobacco
contributions received.151 According a Journal of American Medical
Association Editorial, the study "reveals a high correlation between campaign
donations and the failure of legislators enact tobacco control measures." The
editorial also claimed that the study exposed how tobacco contributions
corrupt the legislative process and that the study should be utilized for efforts
to enact campaign finance reform. The tobacco industry in response to the
study found "striking ironies" in that the American Medical Association's
Political Action Committee outspent tobacco interests by almost two to one.152
B. State Governments
Besides wielding heavy influence in Congress, the tobacco industry lobby is
also prevalent in state legislatures. A second study published in the same issue
of the Journal of American Medical Association found that the tobacco
industry's state campaign contributions have also produced results favorable
to the tobacco industry. Once again, legislative behavior followed tobacco
contributions rather than constituent support.153 From January 1, 1991 to
December 31, 1992, the tobacco industry contributed an average of 10,402
dollars per member of the California General Assembly. Seventy-four of the
eighty state legislators accepted the contributions, and the Assembly speaker
received 221,367 dollars in contributions. 154 Subsequent to the 1994 published
study, the state of California in 1995 became the first state in the nation to attain
the highest grade, "outstanding," on the Coalition on Smoking OR Health's
second annual Report Card for State Tobacco Control. 155 The report card
assessed the tobacco control performance of state governments.156 The 1995
1501d. at 1173-74.
1511d. at 1175.
152 Tobacco PAC Money: How Influential on Lawmakers, HEALTH LINE, Oct. 19, 1994.
153 Stanton A. Glantz, et al., Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions Are Affecting
Tobacco Control Policymaking in California, 272 JAMA 1176, 1182 (Oct. 19, 1994).
1541d. at 1178.
155Arnerican Cancer Society California First In Nation To Achieve 'Outstanding' Rank For
Efforts In State Tobacco Control, PR NEWsWIRE, Mar. 13, 1995.
1561995 State Tobacco Control Report Card, "Outstanding:" CA.; "Promising:" 1I-, MD,
MN, NE, NY, RI, UT, WA; "Tair:" AK, AR, CT, FL, IL, IA, ME, NV, NH, OR, VT, WI;
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grade was awarded after the state of California enacted smoke free workplace
and minor access laws and defeated a referendum supported by Philip Morris
to impose weaker statewide smoking regulations. Nevertheless, the tobacco
industry in California employs influential lobbyists and public relation firms
and contributed 738,166 dollars to legislative candidates in 1994.157
Inside the state capitols, the tobacco industry's strategy of lobbying has been
dubbed "astroturf' because the industry presents well-orchestrated opposition
to tobacco control initiatives as an ordinary "grassroots" movemenL1S8 The
tobacco industry realizes that the industry is widely disliked by the public. The
tobacco lobby, therefore, often shuns publicity and prefers to work behind the
scenes with organizations in the business community.159 The tobacco industry
has been repeatedly referred to as the "invisible enemy" by tobacco control
advocates. 160 The tobacco industry utilizes small business owners, hospitality
industry associations, and other groups funded by the tobacco industry to
testify at committee hearings or sponsor letter writing campaigns against
tobacco control initiatives. 161
The tobacco industry's primary legislative goal at the state level is to preempt
local government's discretion to enact tobacco control ordinances. The
legislation is usually promoted as a pro-health initiative that establishes
uniform restrictions, which are usually weak, and local governments are then
prevented from adopting more restrictive initiatives. 162 State preemption
clauses are a "Holy Grail" for the tobacco industry because local communities
have taken the lead in protecting children and adolescents from access to
tobacco products.163 By eliminating local control, the tobacco industry removes
one of the most effective tools to reduce tobacco use among children and
adolescents. The tobacco industry claims that preemption is necessary in order
to implement statewide standards for the sale, promotion, and display of
tobacco products.164 This is to avoid a patchwork of different local laws. Since
July, 1992, thirty States enacted additional legislation.to prevent children and
'Poor:" AZ, ID, IN, KS, MA, MO, MT, NJ, ND, NM, OH; And "Failing:" AL, DE, CA, KY,
LA, MS, NC, OK, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, VA. Id.
15 7 Bill Ainsworth, Is Philip Morris Blowing Smoke?, RECORDER, June 3,1994, at 1.
158 d.
1591d.
160 peter D. Jacobson, et al, The Politics Of Antismoking Legislation, 18 J. HEALTH POL.
& L. 787, 804 (Winter, 1993)(examining the political evolution of tobacco control in
Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, and Texas).
1 6 1 1d. at 799.
162Elizabeth Conlisk, et al., The Status Of Local Smoking Regulations In North Carolina
Following A State Preemption Bill, 273 JAMA 805 (Mar. 8, 1995).
163Russ Freyman, Butting In, GOVERNING, Nov., 1995, at 55.
164Karla S. Sneegas, Local Discretion To Enact Tobacco- Prevention Laws, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Feb. 12,1996, at A12.
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adolescent access to tobacco products, however, ten of the thirty new statutes
preempted more stringent ordinances at the local level. 165 Also, sixty-three
percent of all children and adolescent tobacco-control statutes that contain
preemption clauses have been enacted since July, 1992.166 In 1995, preemption
legislation came up for debate in twenty-eight states.167 The tobacco industry
tactic is to show greater willingness to accept some restrictions on tobacco use
and sale, while aggressively seeking preemption provisions in the
legislation. 168 Because the tobacco lobby enjoys great influence, the tobacco
industry has quietly championed weak legislation in state legislatures to
undermine strong local ordinances aimed at the reduction of tobacco sales to
children and adolescents. 169
The tobacco industry argument regarding statewide uniformity of tobacco
regulations is extremely weak. Similarly, the National Rifle Association argues
the same point when fighting local gun control ordinances by cities which are
more restrictive than state gun control laws. The tobacco industry's argument,
however, is flawed because it is at the local level where regulations have been
most successful in keeping tobacco products out of the hands of children and
adolescents. The preemption of local ordinances directly removes the homerule
powers of local governments and their ability to adequately address specific
areas of public policy such as tobacco control. Furthermore, local ordinances
are not unduly burdensome on retailers and do not restrict adults' right to
purchase tobacco products. In fact, according to an Indianapolis Star
newspaper article, "with over 900 local ordinances on the books in this country,
not one business has gone under as a result of a local tobacco prevention
ordinance." The homerule powers of localities provide for a local solution to a
problem which may differ among the localities of a particular state. If the
tobacco industry lobby was serious about preventing tobacco use among
children and adolescents, then the industry would not support weaker state
measures which preempt local measure which have been proven successful.
Instead, the tobacco industry would support strict statewide measures. The
tobacco industry logical is fatally flawed based on their reasoning for statewide
uniformity.
V. A STATE AND LOCAL POLICY TO SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE TOBACCO USE
AMONG CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS
The tobacco industry publicly agrees that children and adolescents should
not use tobacco products. The tobacco industry has even attempted voluntary
initiatives to prevent children and adolescents' access to tobacco products. For
165 State Laws, supra 34, at 24.
16 6 1d.
167Freyman, supra note 163.
1 6 8 1d. at 56.
169Andrew Wolfson, Tobacco On Trial, LOUISVILLE COuRiER J., Nov. 13,1994, at 15A.
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example, Phillip Morris began a program called "Action Against Access" and
RJ Reynolds provides parents with "How You Can Help Discourage Kids From
Smoking" kits, schools with "Right Decisions, Right Now" program materials,
and retailers with 'Support the Law. It Works." campaign materials. 170 The
tobacco industry also claims to support the final rule of the Synar Amendment
and believes that the states are best equipped to determine how children and
adolescent access laws should be implemented and enforced. 171
The tobacco industry, however, has been able to prevent the enactment of
meaningful legislation in many states to reduce tobacco use among children
and adolescents and has weakened local tobacco control through preemption.
The preemption of local ordinances is the deathknell in the fight to reduce
tobacco use among children and adolescents. This is so because action by local
governments has proven to be most effective in enforcing and enacting laws to
prevent tobacco use among children and adolescents. 172
At the local level, it is difficult and expensive for the tobacco industry to
lobby against every proposed tobacco-control ordinance. In fact,
tobacco-control advocates, who are usually local health community leaders,
have greater political influence at the local level to direct policy than the tobacco
industry.173
According to a Public Health Report, a local ordinance which has a local
license provision and penalty violations of suspension or revocation of the
license for selling tobacco products to minors is an effective tool to reduce
tobacco use among children and adolescents. 174 After enacting such an
ordinance in 1989, the City of Everett, Washington experienced an overall
decline in tobacco use among tenth grade students of nearly six percent, but
more important, the city experienced a thirty percent increase by retailers
requesting proof of age when children and adolescents attempted to purchase
tobacco products. 175
In a widely cited example of local governmental success published in Journal
of the American Medical Association, the City of Woodridge, Illinois,
population of 25,200, enacted legislation modeled after the city's liquor control
ordinances treating tobacco products and alcohol alike. The ordinance enacted
in 1989 contained fifty dollar licensing fees for tobacco vendors, enforcement
170See Statement of Philip Morris U.S.A., Bus. WIRE, July 13, 1995; How You Can Help
Discourage Kids From Smoking, RJ REYNOLDS TOBACCO Co. (1995)(receiving tobacco
industry educational program materials by calling 1-800-366-8441).
171philip Morris U.S.A.'s Statement in Response to HHS rules Implementing Congress'
Decision to Have States Curb Tobacco Sales to Minors, Bus. WIRE, Jan. 18,1996.
172 State Laws, supra note 34, at 24; Paul R. Torrens, et al., Growing up Tobacco Free, 273
JAMA 1326,1327 (May 3, 1995).
173 Jacobson, supra note 160, at 814.
174 M. Ward Hinds, Impact of a Local Ordinance Banning Tobacco Sales to Minors, 107P B.
HEALTH REP. 355 (May/June 1992).
17 51d.
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by local police, and a twenty-five dollar penalty for minor possession.176 In the
year and one half after the ordinance's enactment, a survey of seventh- and
eighth-grade students who reported experimenting with cigarettes decreased
from forty-six percent to twenty-three percent and the proportion of daily
underage cigarette smokers decreased from sixteen percent to five percent.177
Moreover, in that same period, through the use of "sting" compliance checks,
the City found that the proportion of retail stores selling cigarettes to minors
substantially decreased from seventy percent to three percent.178 According to
the Journal of the American Medical Association, the success of the City of
Woodridge was due to police conducted compliance checks, extensive
community education, and media exposure. 179 Today, the ordinance remains
highly successful after six years of its enactment by the Woodridge City
Council. This author contacted the City of Woodridge Police Department and
interviewed Woodridge City Police Sergeant Ed Kelter who is in charge of the
ordinance's enforcement mechanism. According to Sergeant Kelter, the
statistics regarding illegal sales from the journal article have "remained the
same with some variables." The City continues to conducts four random sting
operations each year or if a report is received, the police will conduct a
compliance check on that specific retailer. Sergeant Kelter also commented that
the ordinance also caused a number of businesses which included national
franchise restaurants to remove vending machines and discontinue selling
tobacco products because "its not worth the trouble." The Woodridge Police
sergeant attributed the continued enforcement of the ordinance as the main
reason for the continued reduction of tobacco use among children and
adolescents.
The City of Chicago also has been successful in reducing tobacco sales to
children and adolescents by local ordinances. In Chicago, store owners
violating illegal sale laws to minors are fined $200 and can lose their licenses
to sell tobacco products. Through the use of "sting" operations conducted by
the Chicago Department of Revenue every two months, the rate of illegal sales
decreased from eighty-seven percent to sixteen percent.1S0
A licensing ordinance with penalties for sales to children and adolescents
has been proven effective elsewhere. For example, the City of Indianapolis in
1994 enacted a licensure ordinance requiring fifty dollars annual fees and
includes a five hundred dollar fine for a first offense and one thousand dollar
fine for a second offense for the sale tobacco products to minors. A survey of
176For a detailed summary of the Woodridge ordinance, see Leonard A. Jason, et al.,
Active Enforcement of Cigarette Control Laws in the Prevention of Cigarette Sales to Minors,
266 JAMA 3159, 3160 (Dec. 11, 1991).
1 7 7 1d.
178Id.
1791d. at 3161.
180Howard Wolinsky, Proposals Made to Linit Kids' Access to Tobacco, CHICAGo
SuN-TiMEs, Oct. 8,1995, at 71.
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random "sting" compliance checks conducted by Doctors and Lawyers for a
Drug-Free Youth revealed that not one store sold tobacco products to the
survey's underage volunteers.18 1
Another effective local tool is education. Education combined with
enforcement has had a significant effect on retail store tobacco sales to
minors.182 A study published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association was conducted to examine the effects of community education and
enforcement of access tobacco laws in four Northern California communities.
It was found that after implementation of community and retail merchant
education and enforcement activities the rate of illegal tobacco sales decreased
from seventy-one percent to twenty-four percent in a two year span.' 83
There has been a recent change in the nation's cultural attitude towards
tobacco use among children and adolescent. For instance, fifteen years ago
widespread support for tobacco restrictions would have been virtually
nonexistent. A major turning point for government involvement came when
former Surgeon General Everett Koop suggested in the Surgeon General's 1988
report on nicotine addiction that tobacco sales should be controlled at least as
tightly as the sale of alcoholic beverages.184
Tobacco should be treated like alcohol, a serious, adult product with serious
consequences for minors caught with tobacco products. The perception of
tobacco products has changed. Unfortunately, many Congress members and
state legislators have not caught on to the cultural change, and instead have
responded to the tobacco industry's dollars. As public awareness increases
about the problem of tobacco use among children and adolescents and
continued negative publicity follows the tobacco industry, dramatic legislative
changes will occur. In fact, a major breakthrough recently occurred when
Liggett Group became the first tobacco company in history to settle a
health-related lawsuit and agreed to donate a portion of its profits over the next
twenty-five years for programs to encourage tobacco users to quit.185 In
addition, the company also voluntarily agreed to begin complying with certain
provisions of the FDA rule. Liggett, which only represents two percent of the
tobacco market, asserted that the company was not conceding that the FDA
has a right to regulate tobacco products. While the aftermath of the Liggett
settlement has not taken full effect, it appears the tobacco industry may have
181Edwin Brown, Local laws can put the bite on merchants selling cigarettes to minors, MED.
UPDATE, Sept., 1995, at 1.
182 Ellen Feighery, et al., The Effects of Combining Education and Enforcement to Reduce
Tobacco Sales to Minors, 266 JAMA 3168 (Dec. 11, 1991).
1831d. at 3170.
184Office on Smoking and Health, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Reducing
the Health Consequences of Smoking: 25 Years of Progress: A Report of the Surgeon General
(1989).
185Henry Weinstein, Tobacco Firm Agrees To Settle a Health Suit, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 14,
1996 at 1.
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finally cracked because previously the tobacco companies were under the code
of "one for all and all for one". The result of this agreement should bring about
the enactment of stricter regulatory measures at the state and local level.
Nevertheless, a well-organized counterattack to the tobacco industry must
be mounted by parents, teachers, educational groups, medical societies, public
health associations, anti-tobacco organizations, and municipalities at the state
and local level. There is power in numbers and accordingly federal, state and
local elected officials, will eventually respond to such grassroots efforts. Such
efforts need to be directed at the state and local level of governments unless
Congress grants authority to the FDA to regulate tobacco products. This
congressional action, however, is extremely doubtful.
Therefore, in order to effectively combat tobacco use among children and
adolescents comprehensive legislation should be enacted at the state or local
level. This is where Congress delegated such authority. The legislation should
include the banning of vending machines; a retail licensing system similar to
alcohol sales; civil penalties for minors found in possession of tobacco
products; civil fines for retail stores and license suspension or revocation;
enforcement by local police and health departments through the use of random
"sting" operations; and community-based educational programs. The license
fees would provide a source of revenue and self-funded enforcement. It is this
type of legislation which has substantially reduced tobacco use among children
and adolescents. The enforcement component is the key to success in the
reduction of tobacco use among children and adolescents.
The main reason for banning vending machines is such machines provide
easy access for children and adolescents to purchase tobacco products. As
noted earlier in this note, nine studies which examined illegal vending machine
sales found that children and adolescents were able to purchase tobacco
products on average eighty-eight percent of the time. By eliminating vending
machine sales, children and adolescents will have less access to tobacco
products. By reducing access to tobacco products, the percentage of children
and adolescents using such products will decrease. The City of Woodridge is a
prime example on the effect of aggressive enforcement
Furthermore, a retail licensing system also has been successful in reducing
tobacco product use as noted earlier. A retail licensure scheme has many
benefits. First, the license fees received by the state or locality may be used to
enforce laws prohibiting sales to children and adolescents through the use of
police or local health agents whom would enforce the regulations. Secondly,
the fees also could be used for an enforcement fund. The funds could be used
in a variety of areas to reduce tobacco use among children and adolescents. For
example, random sting operations on various retailers to ensure compliance
could be financed through the fund. Additionally, if a retailer conducts an
illegal sale, then a fine could be assessed which also would be placed in the
fund. The funds could be used by local schools for educational programs to
warn children and adolescents on the dangers of using tobacco products. Many
schools already have similar drug and alcohol programs. Besides teaching
about the dangers, the educational programs vould also inform children and
adolescents about the law. The educational programs should inform children
and adolescents that tobacco products are not like soft drinks, candy bars, and
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chewing gum, but rather tobacco products are extremely harmful products to
their health.
Moreover, a licensing system would provide such a listing of all retailers
selling tobacco products. Therefore, the retail licensing system could be used
by the locality to focus their efforts to where illegal sales to children and
adolescents are most prevalent.
Additionally, a key component to reduce tobacco use among children and
adolescents is the threat of revoking the licenses of retailers who violate the
law. This aspect perhaps is more compelling than a fine. If retailers deny selling
tobacco directly to children, the point of purchase is severed, thus, making it
more difficult for children and adolescents from acquiring access to tobacco
products. In order to determine if illegal sales are being conducted, a state or
locality should perform random sting operations using undercover children
and adolescents on a regular basis. This approach would have the effect of
making retailers hesitant to make an illegal sale to children or adolescents.
Moreover, children and adolescents caught illegally possessing or using
tobacco products should not go unpunished. Civil monetary penalties should
be imposed as well as community service for such children and adolescents.
The strong enforcement of regulations prohibiting children and adolescents
from purchasing tobacco products will resolve a number of the problems of
tobacco use among children and adolescents. This effort will send a message
to children and adolescents that tobacco products are an adult product.
On the other hand, placing restrictions on the labeling and advertising of
tobacco products will not have such an immediate impact as strict sales
restrictions. Despite the fact that many studies conclude that the tobacco
industry markets their products towards children and adolescents, the more
compelling reason for children and adolescents to begin tobacco product use
is more than likely peer pressure. Most children and adolescents will use
tobacco products with another friend. It is not because the child was influenced
by a "Joe Camel" advertisement. While not advocating that tobacco industry
marketing techniques do not have any effect on tobacco use of children and
adolescents, advertising restrictions are not nearly effective as strict sales
restrictions which should be imposed by the states and localities to reduce the
thousands of children and adolescents who become regular users of tobacco
products each day. Instead, the problem should be focused at the point of
purchase and at the children and adolescents attempting to purchase or use
tobacco products.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the FDA has a compelling argument from a public health point of
view, the FDA proposed rule to unilaterally assert jurisdiction over tobacco
products is beyond the agency's statutory authority and contrary to the
intention of Congress. Despite public opinion displaying extensive support for
such action, the proposed rule is beyond the FDA's jurisdiction until Congress
provides such authority. Instead, Congress through the Synar Amendment
delegated such authority to the states. The FDA proposed rule, unfortunately,
would not adequately control tobacco use among children and adolescent
because the proposed rule lacks the necessary local enforcement tools which
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have been successful in keeping tobacco products out of the hands of children
and adolescents.
The more appropriate solution to reduce tobacco use among children and
adolescents is for states and local governments to enact tobacco control
initiatives similar to laws regulating alcoholic beverage sales. Like alcohol,
tobacco products are a serious, adult product, and tobacco control initiatives
should have serious consequences when retailers sell tobacco products to
children and adolescents and when children and adolescents are caught with
such products.
Additionally, local governments should have the ability to enact tobacco
control initiatives more restrictive than state laws. Local ordinances have
proven to be effective. Preemption of local tobacco control initiatives is the
deathknell of reducing tobacco use among children and adolescents. This
means coordinated efforts must be conducted to fight preemption clauses at
the state level.
By preventing the comer neighborhood store from selling tobacco products
to "little Johnny or Jane," a major aspect of the problem of tobacco use among
children and adolescents will be resolved. The state and local levels of
government are best capable of preventing tobacco use among children and
adolescents, not the federal government.
TIMoTHY J. DEGEETER

